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HAND IT OVER: EUROVISION, EXCLUSIVE 
EU SPORTS BROADCASTING RIGHTS, AND 
THE ARTICLE 85(3) EXEMPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The acquisition of exclusive sports broadcasting rights is the 
main broadcasting issue in the EU.1 In this highly competitive indus-
try, broadcasters attempt to attract maximum audiences.2 They do so 
by offering exclusive coverage of a given sports event.3 Sponsors and 
advertisers pay broadcasters more to advertise their products when 
they believe larger audiences will, in fact, watch an event.4 This belief, 
in turn, propels broadcasters to pay more for the right to be the ex-
clusive broadcaster of a given event.5 
Part I of this Note presents background information on the EU 
sports broadcasting industry. It then introduces the European Broad-
casting Union (EBU), a non-profit consortium of public broadcasters, 
and Eurovision, its system of joint program acquisition and reciprocal 
exchange of signals. This section also considers the EU Competition 
laws, specifically Article 85(1) restraints on competition and Article 
85(3) exemptions, which, if granted, declare 85(1) prohibitions inap-
plicable. 
Part II compares public broad~asters like EBU members with pri-
vate broadcasters, who have more commercial goals. It also discusses 
the tension resulting from the attempts of both to gain exclusive 
rights to broadcast sports events and thus to attract larger audiences. 
Part III analyzes the Eurovision system, the competition between 
public and private broadcasters, and whether Eurovision deserves an 
Article 85 individual exemption. Finally, this Note concludes that 
though Eurovision does restrict competition between some EBU 
members and between EBU members and private broadcasters, the 
1 See Coopers & Lybrand, The Impact of European Union Activities on Sport, 17 Loy. LA 
INT'L & COMPo LJ. 245, 285 (1995). 
2 See id. 
S See id. 
4 See id. 
S See id. 
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Court of Justice (ECJ) should grant an Article 85(3) exemption when 
it reviews the pending appeal challenging the arrangement.& 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Broadcasting sports Events 
Major sports events are among the programs that attract the most 
viewers.' Examples include the World Cup and the Olympics.s There 
is heavy competition to be the exclusive broadcaster of sports events 
in a given geographical area because broadcasters want to attract the 
advertising dollars that flow from large viewing audiences.9 
The broadcasting of sports events achieves high figures for view-
ers with strong buying power, particularly with sixteen to fifty year-old 
men. IO This target audience is essential for advertisers because it is a 
readily identifiable group not easily reached by other programs.ll As a 
result, the demand to advertise on sports event broadcasts has in-
creased, as has the competition for the television right to broadcast 
those events. I2 
The right to broadcast sports events is granted usually for a given 
territory, per country, on an exclusive basis. I3 Broadcasters consider 
exclusivity necessary in order to guarantee the value of a given sports 
program.14 The value consideration is in terms of the number of 
viewers and the amount of advertising dollars an event attracts.I5 
6 See Cases Lodged Before the Court of justice (1989) (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://curia. 
eu.int/en/afz/index.htm>. The pending appeal number is C-320/96P. See Kruidvat v. 
Commission Opinion, at n.88 (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/ 
form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=&datefs=&datefe=&nom-
usuel=kruidvat&domaine=&mots=&resmax=1 OO.htm>. 
7 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 285. For example, the 1998 World Cup final 
game attracted almost 24 million viewers in the United Kingdom, sometimes reaching an 
80% market share. See EBU Warning: Will the General Public Miss Out on the Next World Cup 
Celebration of Football in 2002? (\isited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://www.ecu.ch/press_598a. 
htm>. It also attracted 24 million viewers in Germany and 20 million in Italy, sometimes 
reaching 74% and 84% market shares respectively. See id. 
S See Commission Decision relating a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/32.150 - EBU/Euro,ision System), 1993 OJ. (L 179) 23,26. 
9 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 285. 
10 See Eurovision S)lstem, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 26. 
II See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 284. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
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A sports event's organizer initially owns the broadcasting rights to 
a given event. I6 The organizer controls access to the premises where 
the event occurs.t7 It usually admits only one host broadcaster (i.e., 
the broadcaster in the country where the event takes place) to pro-
duce the television signal. I8 In this way, the organizer controls the 
broadcasting of the event and guarantees exclusivity.I9 The host 
broadcaster then must secure broadcast rights from the event organ-
izer to televise the event within its own national territory.20 
Other broadcasters typically try to secure similar exclusive rights 
to broadcast events within their respective national territories.21 They 
do so either from the host broadcaster or some other owner of the 
television rights.22 These rights are either in the form of a license to 
exploit the material produced by the host broadcaster or an assign-
ment of all rights.23 In an assignment, the host retains the ability to be 
the exclusive broadcaster of the event in its own national territory.24 
In the past, the prices for television rights to sports events stayed 
relatively low.25 Event organizers concerned themselves more with en-
suring coverage to attract sponsorship and promote popularity of an 
event.26 In recent years, organizers have recognized the increased 
competition for the broadcast rights and, in turn, have increased the 
broadcast fees.27 For example, the fees paid in the EU for the right to 
broadcast the Olympics rose from $90 million U.S. for the summer 
1992 Barcelona Games to $250 million U.S. for the summer 1996 At-
lanta Ganles.28 These amounts skyrocketed to $3.44 billion U.S. for 
the exclusive European rights to the five Summer and Winter Olym-
pics between 2000-2008.29 In comparison, NBC paid a similar $3.5 
16 See id. 
17 Sce id. 
18 See Eumvision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 27. 
19 See Coopers & Lybrand, supmnote 1, at 285. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
2S See id. 
24 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 285. 
25 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 27. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Shailagh Munay, Show oj Stl'1!llgth: EBl' Sees Competition from Commcnial n' Emde Its 
Buying Power-Union oj Public Broadcasters Faces .\lore Ril'als ill Battle Jor Pmgmms and Fiewt'1:5, 
WALL ST.]. EUR.,July 3,1996, available ill 1996 \\l..-WSJE 10746653. In addition, the EBU 
paid $344 million U.S. for the excltlsin' light to broadcast the \,"odd Cup soccer matches 
iu 1990, 1994, aud 1998. See id. The \"altle of these rights iuneased extraordinarily when 
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billion U.S. for the exclusive right to broadcast the same events in the 
United States.30 
International sports rights agencies also have emerged as players 
in this game.31 Sports event organizers maximize revenue by selling 
broadcast rights for many territories in one bundle to an agency, 
which then unbundles the rights by selling them to individual broad-
casters for the exclusive right to broadcast in their respective national 
territories.32 The event organizers thus avoid separate negotiations 
with individual broadcasters for rights to broadcast in different terri-
tories.33 This method facilitates rights acquisitions by private, com-
mercial broadcasters who are not members of the EBU.34 
B. The EBU and the Eurovision System 
The EBU is one of the most important EU players in the broad-
casting world.35 Created in 1950, it is a non-profit-making trade asso-
ciation of radio and television organizations.36 It aims to promote ra-
dio and television exchange among its members by all possible 
means.37 Because the EBU has no commercial goal, it does not admit 
purely commercial broadcasters as members.38 Instead, its active 
members are public mission broadcasters who must satisfy obligations 
set by national law and practice regarding their programs and audi-
ence coverage.39 Its associate members are broadcasters who other-
Germany's Kirch Group, a commercial broadcaster, paid $2.36 billion U.S. for the broad-
cast lights to the 2002 and 2006 World Cups. See William Echikson, Goodbye Hoodlums, Hello 
Big Money, Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10770679. 
30 See Richard Sandomir, USOC's Next Steps: Clean Up Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
31 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 27. 
32 See id. at 27-28. 
33 See id. 
34 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 285. 
35 See id. at 286. 
36 See Joined Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93, Meu'opole Television 
SA and Reti Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevision Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de Televi-
sion v. Commission 11 (Ct. First Instance 1996), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, CELEX 
File. 
37 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 23. However, me EBU has been criticized 
for the fact mat Canal Plus (a French channel) is a current member even mough, subse-
quent to entry into me EBU, it transformed into a pay-per-view commercial broadcaster. 
See Murray, supra note 29. 
38 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 286. 
39 See id. Currently, the EBU has 69 active members in 50 countries throughout 
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. See All EBU Active Members (visited Sept. 23, 
1999) <http://www.ebu.ch/membership.htm>. 
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wise satisfy all of the EBU membership requirements but operate out-
side of the EBU broadcast area.4O 
EBU members are obligated to cover an entire national popula-
tion and, in fact, actually must cover a substantial part thereof, while 
using their best efforts to achieve full coverage.41 They must provide 
varied and balanced programming for all sections of the population, 
including a fair share of programs catering to minority/special inter-
ests, irrespective of the ratio of program cost to audience size.42 Pre-
sumably, this prevents members from focusing strictly on major sports 
events that may be the most popular, and thus, attract the most view-
ers.43 In addition, members actually must produce, or commission 
under their own editorial control, a substantial portion of the pro-
grams they broadcast.44 
Eurovision constitutes the main framework for the joint acquisi-
tion and cost sharing and the exchange of programs among active 
members.45 This system, created in 1954, is organized and coordi-
nated by the EBU.46 EBU members compete individually against each 
other and/or private broadcasters for national sports events.47 Euro-
vision therefore applies only to international sports events.48 It is 
based on the understanding that members offer to the other mem-
bers, on the basis of reciprocity, their news coverage of important 
events as well as their coverage of current affairs, sports events, and 
cultural events that are of potential interest to other members.49 
The Eurovision system is based on reciprocity: whenever one 
member covers a sports event occurring in its own national territory, 
it offers coverage free of charge to all other members on the under-
40 See EUl"lwision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 24. The EBU has 49 associate members in 
30 COWl tries, circling the globe from Australia to the United States and Canada. See All 
EBU Associate Members (\isited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.ebu.ch/membership.htm>. 
41 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 23-24. 
42 See id. at 24. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAw AND BUSINESS 
1790 (1997). 
46 See Metropole Television SA, at 14 (Ct. First Instance 1996). Though the focus of this 
Note is the broadcasting of sports events, EurO\ision does distribute current e\'ent footage 
for news and other programs, such as educational documentaIies and music competitions. 
See The EBU in Brief (~sited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.ebu.ch/oveniew.htm> . 
47 See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1791. 
48 See id. 
49 See Metropole Television SA, at 14 (Ct. First Instance 1996). 
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standing that it will receive corresponding services from other mem-
bers when events take place in their respective countries.50 
All interested EBU members jointly acquire television rights to an 
event, and then share the lights and the related fees among them-
selves.51 Whenever EBU members from two or more countries want to 
broadcast a given sports event, they request coordination from the 
EBU.52 A member in whose country the event occurs, or the EBU it-
self, then conducts negotiations (on behalf of the interested EBU 
member(s» with the event's organizer. 53 EBU members may negoti-
ate separately only after joint negotiations fai1.54 
Members who compete with each other for audiences have to 
agree among themselves on the procedure for attributing priority to 
one of them.55 For example, they could agree to alternate transmis-
sion of an event.56 If the parties do not reach agreement, they obtain 
non-exclusive rights to broadcast the event in their same national ter-
ritory.57 
The EBU statutes provide for contractual access to Eurovision for 
third party non-members.58 Non-members may gain access for live 
transmission if no EBU member in the country concerned has re-
served its own live transmission of a sports event.59 When an EBU 
member does opt to broadcast an event live in the country con-
cerned, non-members may gain access for deferred transmission at 
least one hour after the conclusion of an event.60 The third party and 
the EBU negotiate the access fees for both the broadcast right and the 
television signal routing right.61 If a dispute develops over the access 
50 See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45 at 1791. 
51 See id. 
52 See Euruvision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 28. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See ''lISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1791. These competitoJ:S may be members fmm 
the same country or members fmm different countries whose bmadcasts reach the other's 
country in the same language. See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. In 1998, the EBU relayed 7,700 hours of sports and cultural pmgrams to its 
members thmugh Eumvision. See The EBU in Figures (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http:/ / 
www.ebu.ch/numbers.htm>. Potentially, 640 million viewers in more than 255 million 
homes receive Eurovision. See id. 
os See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45 at 1791. 
59 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 29. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 30. 
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fee, the parties may request arbitration by an independent expert, or, 
if both parties agree, by three experts.62 
C. The EC Competition Laws 
Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome states that one of the activities 
of the European Community is the institution of a system ensuring 
that competition in the Community is not distorted.63 The fundamen-
tal rules on competition are contained in Articles 85 and 86.64 Article 
85 provides the basis for the following analysis of how EC competition 
laws reconcile with the granting of exclusive rights to broadcast sports 
events. 
Article 85 prohibits all agreements that may affect trade between 
the Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction, or distortion of competition within the common market.65 
Any such agreements are automatically void, although there are cer-
tain exceptions to this general rule.66 Article 85 prohibitions become 
inapplicable to an agreement when the agreement otherwise contrib-
utes to the promotion of economic progress and only imposes restric-
tions indispensable to the attainment ofthe agreement's objectives.67 
Council Regulation 17 grants the Commission the power to im-
plement Articles 85 and 86 and, therefore, to grant 85(3) exemp-
tions.68 Direct parties to an agreement or those persons who otherwise 
have a sufficient interest may file a complaint to the Commission.69 
The Commission has a number of options: it can dismiss the com-
plaint, provide a negative clearance or comfort letter, or make an ex-
amination and decision regarding exemption.70 Should the Commis-
62 See id.; see also EBU Non-Members Access to Eurovision Sports Programmes (visited Sept. 23. 
1999) <http://www.ebu.ch/conditions.html> . 
63 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 27, 1957, 298 
V.N.T.S. 11. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 21, 69 (6th ed. 1997). 
69 See id. at 21-22. 
70 See id. A dismissal, negath'e clearance, or comfort letter are functionally the same: 
the Commission declares that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no 
grounds for Article 85 action on its part. See id. at 144. A negative clearance is more formal 
than a comfort letter, which is less cumbersome and more frequently used. See id. \\'hen 
the Commission decides to implement Article 85 and examine whether all exemption is 
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sion decide to grant an exemption, it may issue either an individual or 
group exemption.7I 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Clash Between Public and Private BroadcasttrrS 
The issue of exclusive broadcasting of sports events should be 
considered in the context of the ongoing struggle between public and 
private broadcasters.72 In the past, public television companies domi-
nated the market.73 There are now, however, many private broadcast-
ers who compete for exclusive rights to broadcast sports events.74 
These companies developed in part through a combination of the 
deregulation of the television broadcasting industry in some Member 
States and the introduction of satellite-to-cable and direct satellite 
television. 75 
Private, commercial broadcasters are financed mainly through 
advertisers and subscription fees. 76 Public broadcasters, on the other 
hand, receive financing mainly through a license fee and some adver-
tisement revenue, subject to restrictions like revenue ceilings and 
maximum advertising spots per day.77 
When the EBU formed in 1950, public sector organizations en-
trusted with the operation of a public service provided most radio and 
television broadcasting services in Europe.7s These organizations en-
joyed a seeming monopoly over the broadcasting of all television pro-
grams, including sports events.79 In the late 1980s, purely commercial, 
private broadcasters emerged to capitalize on the rising popularity of 
sports and the related market for viewers and advertising revenue.so 
due, it can either exempt the challenged agreement or order the parties to terminate the 
infringement. See id. at 68-72,144. 
71 See id. at 68-72. Individual exemptions govern only the agreement at issue; group 
exemptions define the sort of agreements that come within them, such as technology li-
censes or exclusive distribution agreements. See id. 
72 See Coopers & Lybrand, supmnote 1, at 285. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 25. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 24. 
78 See Metropole Television SA, at 11 (Ct. First Instance 1996). 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 11-12. 
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In Europe, these private broadcasters include a number of all-sports 
broadcasters, such as Eurosport, Screensport, and Sky Sports.81 
Today, the broadcasting industry is in a state of transition, with 
private, commercial broadcasters expanding their market activities 
and gaining significant audience shares.82 They provide technical in-
novations, offer broader choices for viewers, and create competition 
that benefits viewers, advertisers, and sports event organizers.83 
As their audience share increases, these commercial broadcasters 
prove formidable competitors to the traditional public broadcasters in 
both the advertisement and program procurement markets.84 The 
public EBU members compete sometimes at a growing disadvantage 
against commercial channels, which are in some cases backed by pow-
erful media conglomerates.85 The EBU members face various con-
straints arising from their public mission that the private broadcasters 
do not encounter.86 In particular, members face limitations on spon-
sorship and advertising that often hamper their ability to buy and ex-
ploit programs in a commercially viable way.87 
Public and private, commercial broadcasters take different ap-
proaches to the broadcasting of sports.88 Public broadcasters, by virtue 
of their public mission, cater to minority, or less popular, sports in ad-
dition to major sports events.89 They tend to cover a broader range of 
sports events and do so from an event's beginning to end, irrespective 
of costs and revenue considerations.9o 
Purely commercial broadcasters, with the exception of all-sports 
channels, are more interested in mass-appeal sports events that attract 
advertisers and persuade viewers to subscribe to their services.91 Fur-
thermore, they care less about sports events that require expensive 
production efforts relative to the broadcasting time and advertise-
ment revenue generated from such an event.92 
81 See Euravision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 25. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. For example, Sky Sports is owned by BSkyB, a subsidialT of Rupert Murdoch's 
News Corp. See Stanley Reed, Drawing a Bead on BSl1yB, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1996, available in 
1996 \VL 10771470. 
86 See Euravision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 25. 
8i See id. 
88 See id. at 26-27. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 27. 
91 See Euravision S),stem, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 25. 
92 See id. 
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B. Eurovision Does Distort Competition Within the Common Market 
By allowing for the joint negotiation, acquisition, and sharing of 
broadcast rights and the exchange of programs, Eurovision's object 
and effect is greatly to restrict, if not eliminate, competition between 
EBU members.93 EBU members agree to joint acquisition and sharing 
of signals instead of competing against each other on an open market 
for the right to broadcast in a given area.94 
Eurovision enables EBU members to strengthen their individual 
market positions to the disadvantage of their competitors.95 Without 
Eurovision, EBU members would have less market power and, conse-
quently, less ability to secure exclusive broadcast rights for major 
sports events.96 This is a result of the sports broadcasting industry de-
veloping into a rich person's game where broadcasters pay big bucks 
because they perceive advertisers and viewers as likely to do the 
same.97 
Eurovision distorts competition among EBU members and be-
tween EBU members and private, commercial broadcasters who do 
not share its rationalization and cost savings.98 Its effect is to exclude 
private broadcasters unaffiliated with the EBU from the reciprocal 
benefits of the joint acquisition and program exchange.99 
C. Eurovision Deserves an Article 85(3) Exemption 
1. Procedural History Regarding Eurovision 
In Eurovision, the European Commission (Commission) con-
cluded that the Eurovision system violated Article 85 (1), but neverthe-
less issued an 85(3) exemption. IOO It reasoned that Eurovision re-
duced transaction costs, benefited smaller members, enabled co-
ordination by different channels within countries, and facilitated ex-
change of programs between countries.lOl In response, certain private 
93 See id. at 31. 
94 See id. at 28. 
95 See id. at 32. 
96 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 28. 
97 See Echikson, supra note 29; Murray, supra note 29. 
9B See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 31-32. 
99 See id. at 28. 
100 See id. at 37. 
101 See John Temple Lang, iWedia, lWultimedia, and European Community Antitrust Law, 21 
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1296, 1331 (1998). 
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broadcasters requested that the Court of First Instance (Court) annul 
the Eurovision decision.102 
In Metropole, the Court ruled that the Commission failed to con-
sider first whether the EBU's membership rules were objective and 
sufficiently determinate and capable of uniform, non-discriminatory 
application.103 The Court reasoned that the Commission had to make 
this determination before assessing whether the membership rules 
were indispensable within the meaning of Article 85(3).104 In effect, 
the Court said that the EBU membership criteria were so vague that it 
was impossible to tell whether they were indispensable as required by 
Article 85(3) .105 
Furthermore, the Court said that the Commission equated the 
EBU public mission constraints with Article 90(2) "services of a gen-
eral economic interest."106 It also said that the substance of Article 
90(2) could not be the criterion for applying Article 85(3), given that 
the Commission itself said that 90(2) did not apply.l07 Public interest 
obligations may be considered, the Court reasoned, but only by ex-
plaining in financial and qualitative terms how exclusive purchasing is 
indispensable.1Os The ECJ will have to decide the legality of Eurovision 
when it considers the EBU's appeal of Metropole. 109 
2. An Analysis of Eurovision 
The ECJ should perform a four-factor test applied in Article 
85(3) analyses and grant an individual exemption for the Eurovision 
arrangement.no In this analysis, the ECl should ask and answer four 
questions: Positive Questions 1 and 2 and Negative Questions 1 and 
102 See Metropole Television SA, at 8 (Ct. First Instance 1996). 
103 See id. at 51-52. 
104 See id. 
105 See Lang, supra note 101, at 1331. 
106 ld. Prior to Metropole, the Community courts had never quashed an exemption 
granted by the Commission. See KoRAH, supra note 68, at 70. 
107 See Lang, supra note WI, at 1331. 
108 See id. at 1331-32. 
109 See Kruidvat, at n.88 (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://curia.eu.int/jmisp/cgi-bin/ 
form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=&datefs=&datefe=&nomu 
suel=kruidvat&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.htm>. The following analysis examines 
whether the Eurovision system merits an Article 85(3) exemption. It does not, however, 
comment on the propriety of the Court's cUlTently un-affirmed conclusion that the EBU 
membership criteria first must be reviewed or that financial and qualitative data must be 
provided. SeeLang, supra note 101, at 1331-32. 
110 SeeD.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAw 129-40 (2d ed. 1993). 
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2.111 Eurovision survives an Article 85(3) exemption analysis only if, 
during its review, the Eel answers yes to the first two questions and no 
to the last two. ll2 
a. Positive Q:testion 1: Does Eurovision Improve the Production or Distribu-
tion of Goods or Promote Technical Economic Progress? 
It is essential that the Eel clearly identify and balance the eco-
nomic benefits derived from Eurovision against the detriment placed 
on the competitive process. ll3 Improvement or progress can include 
almost any kind of beneficial alteration to the operation of industry 
or commerce, including an increased output from a given number of 
input, better quality in production, and a greater range of products 
produced from the same input. lI4 Typically, a flexible approach and 
broad interpretation results in an affirmative response to this question 
in a variety of situations and many different types of economic prog-
ress and technical advances.lI5 
The Eel should respond affirmatively to this question.lI6 Via 
Eurovision, EBU members jointly acquire and transmit more sports 
events to more national territories and more viewers.lI7 EBU mem-
bers otherwise would be unable to acquire rights to broadcast major 
sports ev~nts because they face limits on the amount of money they 
can apply to sports events, which comprise only a portion of their 
overall programming.ns Through Eurovision, these public broadcast-
ers acquire rights from the joint acquisition system and share the re-
lated fees.lI9 
Viewers who otherwise would be unable to watch a given event 
also realize the benefits from Eurovision.120 For example, a given 
viewer who cannot afford to pay the subscription fees required by a 
private commercial broadcaster would not be able to watch a given 
event if the event were broadcast on such a commercial channel. 
Eurovision, however, enables that viewer to watch an event by ena-
11l See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 132-33. 
114 See id. at 133. 
115 See GoYDER, supra note 11 0, at 135. 
116 See id. at 132-35. 
117 See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1791. 
118 See id. at 1789-90 n.320. 
119 See Eurovision System, 1993 OJ. (L 179) at 28. 
120 See id. at 25. 
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bling public broadcasters to acquire and then broadcast the event on 
free television, as part of their comprehensive attempt to satisfY their 
public mission goals. l2l In this process, there is an increased output 
and thus a greater range of products produced (more televised events 
on free television) from the same input (EBU members)J22 
b. Positive Qjtestion 2: If So, Does Eurovision Allow Consumers a Fair Share 
of the Resulting Benefit? 
A general sentiment exists that this condition closely accompa-
nies an affirmative answer to Positive Question 1.123 That is, the 
benefit achieved by an affirmative answer to Positive Question 1 pre-
sumably trickles down to consumers. I24 A broad interpretation as-
smnes that so long as the agreement is capable of producing some 
advantage in the course of normal trade, even if no subsequent 
benefit has already been realized, it is sufficient.I25 
A consumer may be either the ultimate end-user or those who 
acquire the goods at any stage of production. I26 This implies that ei-
ther viewers or EBU members themselves may be consumers who re-
ceive a fair share of the resulting benefit. I27 
The Eel should respond affirmatively to this question because 
two types of consumers receive the benefits of Eurovision. First, the 
individual EBU members are able to acquire the rights through Euro-
vision. I28 Second, they pass these benefits to viewers when they broad-
cast sports events on free television. I29 
c. Negative Question 1: Does Eurovision Impose Restrictions Not Indispens-
able to the Attainment of the Objectives Already Referred to? 
It is essential that the restrictions are tailored strictly to the valid 
purposes of the agreement and that any damage to the competitive 
process not spill over to a wider effect. I30 By considering necessity in 
121 See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1789-90 n.320. 
122 See GOYDER, supra note 1l0, at 133. 
123 See id. at 136. 
124 See id. 
125 See id .. 
126 See id. at 135. 
127 See GOYDER, supm note llO, at 135. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 136. 
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relation to proportionality, the underlying inquiry is whether the eco-
nomic advantage can be obtained by less sweeping restrictions,131 
The ECj should respond negatively to this question. While an 
alternative could be to allow both public and private broadcasters to 
share broadcast rights in a given geographical territory, this remedy 
runs contrary to the basic rationale of exclusivity in sports broadcast-
ing: the idea that the value of the broadcast rights lies in the grant of 
exclusivity,132 If a broadcaster does not have the exclusive right to 
broadcast an event in a given territory, viewers may opt to watch an 
event on one of many channels broadcasting the event.133 Viewers be-
come less likely to pay to watch an event when they can watch it on 
free television.134 Advertisers therefore become unlikely to pay large 
fees to a single broadcaster, especially since viewers may watch the 
event on another channeJ.135 Because Eurovision enables member 
broadcasters merely to compete better with private broadcasters as 
both try to secure exclusivity in broadcast rights (and related advertis-
ing revenues), it is not too sweeping.136 
d. Negative Question 2: Does Eurovision Afford the Possibility of Eliminating 
Competition in Respect of a Substantial Part of the Products? 
This question relates to the external effect of the agreement and 
indicates the need for a market analysis on both the product and geo-
graphical ranges of the market.137 The ECJ should examine the nature 
of the market, the size of the enterprises concerned, their relative 
market shares, and any structural conditions of the market.138 
The ECj should respond negatively to this question. The market 
affected by Eurovision is the granting of exclusive broadcast rights in 
the EU for international sports events only,139 Eurovision neither con-
fers any benefit to its members nor affects in any way the competition 
for broadcast rights to national sports events.140 
131 See id. at 136-37. 
132 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 1, at 284. 
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139 See WISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1791; Coopers & Lybrand, supra Hote 1, at 285. 
140 See ",rISE & MEYER, supra note 45, at 1791. For example, EBU members received no 
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The ultimate effect of Eurovision is to help public broadcasters 
while conferring no identical benefit for non-EBU members.l4l It 
does not, however, specifically take from the private broadcasters.142 
They still have more finances and are able to compete for exclusive 
rightS.143 Instead of the practical effect of competing among them-
selves (since only they, individually, have the funds to bid highest), 
commercial broadcasters have to contend with one more bidder by 
way of the EBU consortium.l44 The entry of one more bidder does not 
dramatically reduce their respective market shares.l45 
In addition, Eurovision does not totally exclude non-members.l46 
In fact, the EBU, subsequent to the Eurovision decision, greatly 
strengthened third party access.147 Now, non-members may obtain a 
live transmission if no EBU member broadcasts an event.l48 They may 
obtain a deferred transmission if an EBU member does broadcast an 
event live.149 In this way, non-members may gain some access even to 
those events that the EBU has exclusive rights.150 
CONCLUSION 
The nature of the sports broadcasting industry in the EU has de-
veloped rapidly into a pay-for-play world. In the past, public broad-
casters dominated the market and secured exclusive rights to events 
with the goal of encouraging interest in sports. In recent years, private 
broadcasters have entered the ring with the goal of profiting from the 
rising popularity of sports and the related popularity of sports on tele-
vision. Event organizers have reacted to the growing popularity and 
interest (from both fans and broadcasters) by charging more money 
for the exclusive right to broadcast a given event. 
The EBU and Eurovision technically may restrain trade, but the 
ECJ should grant the arrangement an Article 85(3) individual exemp-
tion. Eurovision enables EBU members who otherwise would be un-
national (U.K) Pl"emier League soccer matches, for which Murdoch's BSL:yB paid $998 
million U.S. for four years. See Reed, supm note 85. 
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able to be players in the rising market for exclusive broadcast rights to 
compete with private broadcasters who have more resources and un-
limited program discretion. The private broadcasters remain formi-
dable competitors, with each other and with EBU members, because 
they have extensive financial resources. In effect, Eurovision mini-
mally alters the conditions but still ensures that the game plays on, 
with teams competing on a more level playing field. 
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